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Notes 
A QUEST FOR FAIR AND BALANCED:  
THE SUPREME COURT, STATE COURTS, AND 
THE FUTURE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
REVIEW AFTER PERRY 
CHASE D. ANDERSON† 
Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to 
distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate 
and illegitimate[,] . . . black and white. But that sort of stereotyped 
reaction may have no rational relationship—other than pure 
prejudicial discrimination—to the stated purpose for which the 
classification is being made. 
  – Justice John Paul Stevens1 
 
ABSTRACT 
  Gay rights advocates and social conservatives alike have criticized 
the Supreme Court for its recent decisions concerning sexual 
orientation. An examination of those decisions reveals that, taken 
together, they represent a surprisingly careful balance. The result is a 
principle of neutrality in which the Court has effectively demanded 
that states refrain from taking either side in the culture war 
surrounding sexual orientation. The true test of that neutrality 
principle will arise when the Court considers the constitutionality of a 
same-sex marriage ban. Thus far, challenges have taken place in state 
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 1. Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520–21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
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courts under state constitutions; those judges appear to have been 
guided by their own assumptions and values rather than the Supreme 
Court’s balanced approach. The federal challenge in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger may change the legal landscape. The district court 
ordered a full trial—the first court to do so—and held, based on the 
evidence, that the state constitutional amendment violated the U.S. 
Constitution because it served only to disapprove of gay persons and 
their relationships. This August 2010 decision provides an excellent 
application of the Supreme Court’s state-neutrality principle and will 
offer the Court the chance to weigh in on same-sex marriage. 
INTRODUCTION 
Gay rights advocates and social conservatives alike have 
criticized the Supreme Court for being too sympathetic to the other 
side in its recent decisions concerning sexual orientation. According 
to two prominent gay rights advocates, the Court is not “leap[ing] to 
defend full constitutional equality of gay people.”2 Vocal conservative 
Justice Scalia, meanwhile, maintains that the Court “has largely 
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda.”3 Examining recent 
Court decisions, both sides appear to be right, to some extent. How is 
this possible? This Note examines these decisions and finds that 
although the Court must decide “for or against” gay rights in 
individual cases, its overall body of decisions represents a surprisingly 
careful balance. That balance is enabled by a nod to each side. Under 
one line of cases, employing a “more searching form of rational basis 
review,”4 the Court has effectively prohibited the state from 
disapproving of gay persons through its official acts.5 Under another 
 
 2. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren Spedale, Sit Down, Ted Olson and David Boies, 
SLATE (May 29, 2009, 11:25 AM ET), http://www.slate.com/id/2219252. 
 3. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. at 580 (majority opinion); see also infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part I.A.2. This Note builds upon but makes a bolder claim than previous 
scholarship. One excellent article that denies that the Court imposes state neutrality is William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of 
Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004). According to Eskridge, 
Lawrence gives us nothing less than, but also nothing more than, a jurisprudence of 
tolerance. This means that traditionalists can no longer deploy the state to hurt gay 
people or render them presumptive criminals, but room remains for the state to signal 
the majority’s preference for heterosexuality, marriage, and traditional family values. 
Id. at 1025. Though agreeing that Lawrence established something of a middle ground between 
gay rights advocates and traditionalists, this Note examines a larger body of the Court’s cases 
and argues that under the framework these cases establish, the state cannot, without further 
justification, codify a preference for heterosexuality or homosexuality. See infra Part I. 
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line of cases, using established First Amendment doctrine, the Court 
has struck down antidiscrimination protections for gay persons when 
those protections intrude on private groups’ rights to disapprove of or 
exclude others.6 The result is a principle of neutrality; that is, with the 
convergence of both lines, the Court effectively has demanded that 
the state refrain from taking either side in the culture war7 
surrounding sexual orientation. 
The true test of the neutrality principle will arise if—or, more 
likely, when—the Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of a 
ban on same-sex marriage. The Court has not considered a gay 
marriage ban since 1972, when it dismissed Baker v. Nelson8 “for want 
of substantial federal question.”9 As one court aptly noted decades 
later, however, “Doctrinal developments show it is not reasonable to 
conclude [that] the questions presented in the Baker jurisdictional 
statement would still be viewed by the Supreme Court as 
‘unsubstantial.’”10 Nevertheless, most challenges to marriage bans 
have taken place in the state courts, under state constitutions. The 
balance that has guided the Supreme Court has not heavily influenced 
state courts deciding same-sex marriage cases. Instead, those courts 
appear guided by the judges’ own assumptions and values, resulting in 
unnecessarily divisive opinions.11 
With no direct federal challenges brought since Baker, the 
Supreme Court has thus far stayed out of the gay marriage debate.12 
The federal question was squarely presented, however, in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger,13 a 2009 challenge to California’s Proposition 8—a 
ballot initiative that amended the state constitution to ban same-sex 
 
 6. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 7. This Note will use “culture war” to refer specifically to the social controversy over the 
morality of homosexuality. It recognizes, however, that the term may refer to broader social 
debates as well. Cf. Libby Adler, The Gay Agenda, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 149 (2009) 
(“This part will recall the terms of just one of the culture war’s several frontiers: the battle over 
progress in the treatment of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (GLBT) people and the 
status of same-sex erotic and domestic relations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 8. Baker v. Nelson, 292 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) 
(mem.). 
 9. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (mem.). 
 10. Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Hicks v. 
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, 447 F.3d 
673 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. See infra notes 96–103 and accompanying text. 
 13. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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marriage.14 After a full trial, the District Court for the Northern 
District of California held Proposition 8 unconstitutional because it 
could rationally serve no interest other than to discriminate against 
gay people.15 The August 4, 2010, ruling may offer the Supreme Court 
the chance to weigh in on same-sex marriage—and bring closure to 
the debate in the courts. 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court has struck the 
appropriate constitutional balance between the two sides of the 
culture war. It further argues that the state neutrality demanded by 
that balance requires the recognition of same-sex marriage, as the 
district court held in Perry. Part I examines the two lines of gay rights 
cases in the Supreme Court since the mid-1990s and illustrates the 
ways in which the Court has prohibited state laws that favor either 
side. Parts II and III then apply that principle of state neutrality to 
same-sex marriage. Part II looks at the ten state court rulings since 
the Supreme Court’s 2003 landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas,16 
identifying thematic problems with those state court rulings in light of 
the Supreme Court’s neutrality approach. Part III then discusses 
Perry, arguing that the extensive examination of the evidence during 
trial—and the court’s ultimate determination that the California ban 
served only to discriminate—was a necessary step toward laying the 
gay marriage debate in the courts to rest. 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES A NECESSARY BALANCE IN THE 
CULTURE WAR 
In public discourse, the debate over gay rights has occurred 
largely within the crosshairs of two opposing sets of claimed rights: 
gay individuals’ and same-sex couples’ claims to equal rights and 
other individuals’ rights to disapprove of homosexuality.17 Beginning 
 
 14. California Marriage Act, Proposition 8 (2008) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5). 
 15. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (“Here, the purported state interests fit so poorly 
with Proposition 8 that they are irrational . . . . What is left is evidence that Proposition 8 enacts 
a moral view that there is something ‘wrong’ with same-sex couples.”). See generally id. at 997–
1003 (applying rational basis review and rejecting the proponents’ asserted interests). 
 16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 17. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE 
CLOSET 295 (1999) (“With the advent of laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, 
religious liberty and sexual equality norms collide, and their collision entails a clash of 
constitutional commitments—between the liberty of one group to exclude and the desire of an 
excluded group for equal treatment.” (internal cross-reference omitted)); PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, 
THE SUPREMACISTS: THE TYRANNY OF JUDGES AND HOW TO STOP IT 46 (2006) (“What gays 
now demand is public approval and government support for a lifestyle that others believe is 
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in the mid-1990s, the rulings in the Supreme Court considering gay 
rights have struck a careful balance between the two. Far from taking 
an anti- or pro-gay stance on the diverse questions presented, the 
Court has carefully developed an approach that leaves the sides of the 
culture war free to vehemently disagree with each other, while 
seeking to ensure that the state does not bring its considerable 
influence to bear on either side. Accordingly, the Court has struck 
down state actions that deny basic civil rights to gay people,18 while 
also striking down laws that deny private persons or groups the right 
to assert their moral viewpoints by excluding gays from their ranks.19 
Given the highly contentious nature of the culture war—fueled by 
competing claims of liberty, equal rights, traditional morality, and 
religious belief—the Court’s stance is the proper and necessary 
equilibrium and should guide consideration of the constitutionality of 
same-sex marriage bans. 
A.  The Debate Plays Out in the Supreme Court 
1. Protecting Private Expression.  In three recent cases 
implicating gay rights, the Supreme Court has considered the 
potential collision course of antidiscrimination laws and private 
organizations’ rights of free expression. The first was Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,20 in which a 
unanimous Court ruled that a state could not force St. Patrick’s Day 
parade organizers to include an Irish-American gay group in the 
parade.21 The group had sued, arguing that the parade was essentially 
a public accommodation and that the organizers were thus precluded 
from discriminating under state law.22 The trial court agreed, citing 
the parade organization’s generally nonexclusive criteria, and the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed.23 The U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed, holding that, cohesive message or not, a 
parade put on by private organizers is inherently expressive conduct.24 
 
immoral . . . . That amounts to the minority forcing the majority to license what it 
disapproves.”). 
 18. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 19. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 20. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 21. Id. at 581. 
 22. Id. at 561–62. 
 23. Id. at 562–63. 
 24. Id. at 569; see also id. at 568 (“If there were no reason for a group of people to march 
from here to there except to reach a destination, they could make the trip without expressing 
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Accordingly, the organizers’ message—including their selection of 
fellow marchers—is protected by the First Amendment, and neither 
the government nor other organizations may interfere in that 
decision.25 Whatever the organizers’ reasons for excluding the gay and 
lesbian group, the Court said, “[I]t boils down to the choice of a 
speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is 
presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.”26 The 
government’s motivation in preventing discrimination, the Court said, 
would not justify the state’s intrusion into the right of a private actor 
to control the content of its own message. As the Court explained, 
“While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of 
harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better 
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a 
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the 
government.”27 
The Court further elaborated on the range of protected 
organizations in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.28 There, it held that 
although Boy Scouts of America was not typically engaged in overtly 
expressive conduct—like a parade—and was not a religious 
organization, the group’s message was protected by the First 
Amendment. The case arose when James Dale, an Eagle Scout, was 
kicked out of the Boy Scouts and terminated as a volunteer assistant 
scout master after the organization discovered that he was “an 
avowed homosexual and gay rights activist.”29 Although the Boy 
Scouts asserted that the inclusion of Dale and other gay men as scout 
 
any message beyond the fact of the march itself. Some people might call such a procession a 
parade, but it would not be much of one.”). 
 25. See id. at 573 (“[T]his use of the State’s power violates the fundamental rule of 
protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content 
of his own message.”); id. at 569–70 (“[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitutional 
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate 
an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”). 
 26. Id. at 575. 
 27. Id. at 579; see also id. at 581 (“Disapproval of a private speaker’s statement does not 
legitimize use of the Commonwealth’s power to compel the speaker to alter the message by 
including one more acceptable to others.”). 
 28. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 29. Id. at 644. Dale’s alleged activism included his position as co-president of the Rutgers 
Lesbian/Gay Alliance; his attendance at “a seminar addressing the psychological and health 
needs of lesbian and gay teenagers”; and an interview with a newspaper covering the seminar, in 
which he advocated “homosexual teenagers’ need for gay role models.” Id. at 645. The facts of 
the case imply that the Boy Scouts learned that Dale was gay from the published interview and 
accompanying photo. Id. 
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leaders would conflict with its message,30 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court was not persuaded that its “message” included asserting that 
homosexuality was immoral.31 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected that 
approach. Consistent with its holding in Hurley, the Court noted that 
associational rights long protected by the First Amendment “plainly 
presuppose[] a freedom not to associate,”32 and emphasized that it is 
not the role of the courts to conduct detailed inquiries into what 
messages private groups seek to send and whether their chosen means 
are sensibly related to disseminating those messages.33 That the 
organization did not exist for the purpose of disapproving of 
homosexuality did not deprive it of the right to exclude gays; it was 
enough that the group’s asserted message might be altered by their 
inclusion.34 
The third case, Rumsfeld v. FAIR,35 shows that the Court’s 
protection of group expression has its limits. In FAIR, a group of law 
schools protesting the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy 
sought to invoke First Amendment protections in excluding military 
recruiters from campus, or at least from the same level of access 
provided to other recruiters on campus.36 Under federal law, any 
school denying military recruiters the same quality and quantity of 
access afforded to other recruiters would lose virtually all federal 
funding.37 The group of schools challenged this policy as an 
 
 30. Id. at 644. 
 31. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1223–24 (N.J. 1999) (“We agree that Boy 
Scouts expresses a belief in moral values and uses its activities to encourage the moral 
development of its members. We are not persuaded, however, that a ‘shared goal[]’ of Boy 
Scout members is to associate in order to preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral.” 
(citation omitted) (alteration in original)), rev’d sub nom. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640 (2000). 
 32. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 
(1984)). 
 33. Id. at 651; see also id. at 653 (“As we give deference to an association’s assertions 
regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of 
what would impair its expression.”). 
 34. Id. at 655; see also id. at 656 (“The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose 
to send one message but not the other. The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views 
from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views 
receive no First Amendment protection.”). 
 35. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 
(2006). 
 36. Id. at 52–53. The Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy has since been repealed. See infra note 
70 and accompanying text. 
 37. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2006) (the Solomon Amendment); see also FAIR, 547 U.S. at 55 
(“In order for a law school and its university to receive federal funding, the law school must 
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unconstitutional condition on federal funds, arguing that the policy 
violated their First Amendment rights under the same rationale as in 
Hurley and Boy Scouts.38 In rejecting that claim, a unanimous Court 
emphasized the lack of interference—real or perceived—with any 
message the law schools sought to send39 or with their freedom-of-
association rights. In part, this was due to the schools’ freedom to 
sponsor protests against the military policy or otherwise voice their 
disagreement,40 refuting any suggestion of support for discrimination 
against gays and lesbians. The nature of the accommodation—for 
example, allowing recruiters to meet with students on campus and 
including their announcements with those of other recruiters in career 
service emails—also was substantially different from inclusion in a 
parade or as a leader in a private organization. The schools’ attempt 
at comparison, the Court said, stretched too far;41 though the 
protective wall around private organizational expression is high, it is 
not absolute.42 
 
offer military recruiters the same access to its campus and students that it provides to the 
nonmilitary recruiter receiving the most favorable access.”). 
 38. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 70. 
 39. Id. at 65 (“Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by 
recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools may say 
about the military’s policies.”). 
 40. Id. at 69–70. 
 41. Id. at 70 (observing that the comparison has the dual effect of “plainly overstat[ing] the 
expressive nature of [the law schools’] activity and the impact of the Solomon Amendment on it, 
while exaggerating the reach of our First Amendment precedents”). 
 42. More recently, the Court upheld another law school equal-access policy in Christian 
Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). Hastings Law School refused to recognize a 
chapter of a national Christian organization that, in violation of the school’s antidiscrimination 
policy, banned openly gay students from voting membership or leadership positions. Id. at 2979–
80. The parties entered a joint stipulation of facts, including a statement that the policy was one 
of open access—for all groups and all students—rather than a specific policy banning groups 
from discriminating based on sexual orientation. Id. at 2982. The five-member majority 
accepted the stipulation as fact and held its content neutrality saved it. Id. at 2978. The four-
member dissent, authored by Justice Alito, refused to accept the stipulation as an accurate 
description of the policy as Hastings had applied it and would have held that the policy’s actual 
application violated the organization’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 3005, 3016 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
  Because the majority let the stipulation govern, it is difficult to discern how the Court 
would have ruled absent the “all-comers” policy, and thus difficult to take away any broader 
legal principles from the case. Accepting the stipulation, one can readily attack the policy of a 
law school requiring all student associations—including religious and partisan political ones—to 
accept members and leaders who disagree with the groups’ core beliefs. But it is not clear the 
Court has broken any new constitutional ground if one accepts the stipulation, as the majority 
did; indeed, it appears roughly in line with the open-access principles in Rumsfeld v. FAIR. 
Absent the stipulation, proper application of the neutrality principles discussed in this Section 
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2. Protecting Against the Tyranny of the Majority.  The Court’s 
decisions give wide latitude to private organizations to determine 
what message they send to the public about, among other things, their 
views on homosexuality. Other decisions, however, plainly prevent 
the state from taking a stand in its official actions. In Romer v. 
Evans,43 the Court articulated “a commitment to the law’s neutrality” 
concerning the rights of gay persons.44 At issue was Colorado’s voter-
approved Amendment 2, which amended the state constitution to 
prohibit the inclusion of gays and lesbians in antidiscrimination laws.45 
One effect of the amendment was to overturn ordinances in Aspen, 
Boulder, and Denver that banned such discrimination at the local 
level.46 Its additional effects were a point of contention between the 
Justices. Justice Scalia, dissenting, found that Amendment 2 did no 
more than deny gay persons “special treatment.”47 The majority, 
however, rejected that contention48 and found that Amendment 2 
“prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of 
state or local government designed to protect the named class” of gay 
persons.49 
 
and the next would have required the Court to strike down the Hastings policy. See id. at 2999 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he school policy in question is not content based either in its 
formulation or evident purpose; and were it shown to be otherwise, the case likely should have a 
different outcome.”). For a good critique of the decision, see John D. Inazu, Op-Ed., Siding with 
Sameness, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), July 1, 2010, at 9A; and see also John D. Inazu, The 
Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 195 (2010) 
(criticizing the Martinez majority’s acceptance of the law school’s “non-neutral policy 
preferences” and its “failure to take seriously [the organization’s] freedom of association 
claim”). 
 43. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 44. See id. at 623 (“One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that 
the Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’ Unheeded then, those 
words now are understood to state a commitment to the law’s neutrality where the rights of 
persons are at stake.” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting))). 
 45. Id. at 624. 
 46. See id. at 623–24 (noting that the local ordinances prohibited sexual orientation 
discrimination “in many transactions and activities, including housing, employment, education, 
public accommodations, and health and welfare services”). 
 47. Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 653 (“The people of 
Colorado have adopted an entirely reasonable provision which does not even disfavor 
homosexuals in any substantive sense, but merely denies them preferential treatment.”). 
 48. Id. at 626 (majority opinion). 
 49. Id. at 624; see also id. at 630 (“Amendment 2’s reach may not be limited to specific laws 
passed for the benefit of gays and lesbians. It is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad 
language of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general 
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings.”). 
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On those findings, the Court could readily have made the case 
about generally applicable political process rights, as the Colorado 
Supreme Court had done, and struck down the law on that basis.50 
Such a disposition would have limited the holding to a narrow set of 
cases and broken virtually no new ground for gay rights. But the 
Court took the opposite approach, not only framing it as a gay rights 
issue but also rebuking lawmakers engaged in animus-based 
legislation. Purporting to apply the rational basis test, a highly 
permissive standard of review, the Court held that “Amendment 2 
fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.”51 The amendment 
was “at once too narrow and too broad. It identifie[d] persons by a 
single trait and then denie[d] them protection across the board.”52 
Given the broad disability placed on a narrow class of persons, the 
Court read between the lines of the amendment, finding that it 
existed to disparage gay persons, rather than to serve the state’s 
asserted interests. The Court concluded, “Amendment 2 classifies 
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them 
unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so 
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”53 
The amendment at stake in Romer was, according to the Court, 
unusual. But seven years later, the Court struck down laws targeting 
gays that were widespread and heavily rooted in tradition: laws 
criminalizing homosexual conduct. With its ruling in Lawrence v. 
Texas, the Court held laws in thirteen states unconstitutional,54 
overruled its own precedent set by Bowers v. Hardwick55—which 
upheld a state’s right to criminalize same-sex sexual relations56 just 
seventeen years before Lawrence—and ended the widespread 
classification of gays as “presumptive outlaws.”57 Those 
 
 50. Id. at 625 (“[T]he State Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 was subject to strict 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed the fundamental right of gays 
and lesbians to participate in the political process. To reach this conclusion, the state court 
relied on our voting rights cases and on our precedents involving discriminatory restructuring of 
governmental decisionmaking.” (citations omitted)). 
 51. Id. at 632. 
 52. Id. at 633. 
 53. Id. at 635. 
 54. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
 55. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 56. Id. at 191. 
 57. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1022; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[B]ecause of the sodomy law, being homosexual carries the presumption of being 
a criminal.”). 
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accomplishments alone would have been quite a feat, but the Court 
went further. The terms of the Lawrence opinion were hardly limited 
to gay sex, as the contrary Bowers opinion had been.58 Nor was the 
case decided strictly on privacy grounds, as it likely could have been 
under the Griswold v. Connecticut59 line of cases,60 given that it 
concerned intimate conduct within the home.61 Rather, the opinion 
was about broader notions of liberty and equality—and why gays 
were entitled to expect the same protections as straight people.62 
Sharply criticizing its prior holding in Bowers, the Court said that the 
language of Bowers—and principally its characterization of the 
claimed right—showed that the Court had failed 
to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue 
in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct 
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would 
demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about 
the right to have sexual intercourse.63 
In both Lawrence and Romer, the Court flatly rejected the states’ 
claims that their laws were not targeting gays for disapproval but 
merely furthering some legitimate interest through narrower means. 
 
 58. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91 (“[W]e think it evident that none of the rights 
announced in those [right-to-privacy] cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional 
right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case.”); id. at 191 
(“Precedent aside, however, respondent would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals did, a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.”). 
 59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 60. Cf. Adler, supra note 7, at 152 (noting that the now-discredited Bowers opinion 
“admonished[ that] nothing in the privacy line of cases ‘bears any resemblance to the claimed 
constitutional right’ asserted” in Bowers). 
 61. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–63 (describing the facts of the case). Indeed, the opinion 
began with a discussion of privacy in the home, which is all that would have been required to 
decide the case. See id. at 562 (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in 
the home.”); see also id. at 564 (“[T]he most pertinent beginning point is our decision in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.” (citation omitted)). But the Court went on to explicitly extend the 
holding. See id. at 562 (“Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more 
transcendent dimensions.”). 
 62. See id. at 574 (“[O]ur laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, 
and education. . . . Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, 
just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 63. Id. at 567. 
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The Court noted, for example, that the sodomy bans at issue in 
Lawrence and Bowers “purport[ed] to do no more than prohibit a 
particular sexual act.”64 The Court found that the actual effect of the 
laws, however, was to deny gay persons the freedom to enter into 
relationships of their choosing, and that “[t]he liberty protected by 
the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this 
choice.”65 
Lawrence is powerfully instructive in the state-private 
dichotomy, not just because it struck down longstanding criminal 
penalties for homosexual conduct, but also because of the reasons it 
gave for doing so. The Court said that private beliefs, no matter how 
deeply held, cannot justify state laws discriminating against gays: 
The condemnation [of gay people] has been shaped by religious 
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for 
the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial 
concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and 
moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the 
course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the 
question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may 
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole 
society through operation of the criminal law.66 
The Court concluded that it may not.67 The Court reasoned that 
“[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, 
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private 
spheres.”68 This language went well beyond condemnation of the 
criminal sanctions. Instead, the Court seemed to say that the real 
problem with the sodomy laws was that they constituted 
governmental action that invited discrimination against gay persons—
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 571 (emphasis added). See generally Céline Abramschmitt, Note, The Same-Sex 
Marriage Prohibition: Religious Morality, Social Science, and the Establishment Clause, 3 FLA. 
INT’L U. L. REV. 113, 144–47 (2007) (discussing the Court’s rejection, in Romer and Lawrence, 
of preserving popular morality as a stand-alone rational basis for discrimination). 
 67. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The State cannot demean their existence or control 
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. . . . The Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.”); id. at 579 (reversing the lower court’s decision upholding the statute). 
 68. Id. at 575. 
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and that such an invitation was extended whenever the state officially 
characterized gays as immoral. 
3. A Notable Exception.  The Supreme Court refused to review 
the military’s policy of excluding “out” gay persons from military 
service,69 popularly known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Congress 
repealed the policy on December 18, 2010.70 Courts, however, had 
been reluctant to address the ban. The First Circuit upheld Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell in 2008 against due process, equal protection, and 
free speech challenges.71 The Supreme Court refused to weigh in, 
denying certiorari in the case.72 This may be seen as an exception to 
the Court’s demand of government neutrality. 
But Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell differs from the state laws challenged 
in Romer and Lawrence in one important respect: its roots in claimed 
military necessity. Historically, the Supreme Court has given 
exceptional deference to such claims. During World War II, the Court 
infamously held that the military’s claimed need for Japanese 
internment overrode strict scrutiny;73 more recently, the same claim 
has justified—under heightened scrutiny—exclusion of women from 
combat positions and the requirement that only males register for the 
draft.74 The First Circuit, in considering Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 
recognized the “unique context” of military policies and noted that 
“[t]he deferential approach courts take” in reviewing challenges to 
such policies “is well-established.”75 It concluded that, wise or not, the 
 
 69. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006). 
 70. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 
(repealing 10 U.S.C. § 654). The policy nevertheless remains in effect until sixty days after the 
President and others certify that “the implementation of necessary policies and regulations . . . is 
consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and 
recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces.” Id. § 2(b). For a good description of the repeal 
and the response to it, see Carl Hulse, Senate Repeals Ban Against Openly Gay Military 
Personnel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at A1. 
 71. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 65 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). 
 72. Pietrangelo v. Gates, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). 
 73. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 74. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981); see also id. at 70 (noting that “judicial 
deference to such congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee”); cf. United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 544–45, 555 (1996) (holding that a state military institute’s male-only 
policy—not grounded in military necessity—unconstitutionally discriminated against women). 
 75. Cook, 528 F.3d at 57; see also id. (“It is unquestionable that judicial deference to 
congressional decision-making in the area of military affairs heavily influences the analysis and 
resolution of constitutional challenges that arise in this context.”). 
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policy must be upheld because of that extraordinary deference.76 
Although not decisive in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the Supreme Court 
similarly emphasized military necessity—there, Congress’s interest in 
successful recruitment practices—when it upheld the open-access 
policy against the law schools’ challenge.77 
Even with a healthy dose of military deference, however, the 
tides in the lower courts began to shift against the ban just months 
before Congress repealed it. Within one month of each other, two 
federal district courts held Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell unconstitutional 
under the Due Process Clause.78 
B.  Parallel to Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Principles 
Although this Note does not argue that same-sex marriage bans 
violate the Establishment Clause,79 there are useful parallels between 
Religion Clause jurisprudence and the principles described here. 
Taken together, the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause 
are perhaps best understood as a strong principle of governmental 
neutrality toward religion.80 To the consternation of some religious 
groups, judges have ordered the removal of many signs of religion—
 
 76. See id. at 65 (“Although the wisdom behind the statute at issue here may be questioned 
by some, in light of the special deference we grant Congressional decision-making in this area 
we conclude that the challenges must be dismissed.”). 
 77. See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 67 (2006) (“The issue is not whether other means 
of raising an army and providing for a navy might be adequate. . . . That is a judgment for 
Congress, not the courts.”). 
 78. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2010); 
Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 06-5195RBL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100781, at *24 
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2010). The Witt ruling followed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that Lawrence 
required subjecting the military policy to elevated scrutiny. Witt, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100781, 
at *2–3. 
 79. Other works have discussed the possibility of using this approach. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Same-Sex Marriage and the Establishment Clause, 54 VILL. L. REV. 617 (2009) (arguing 
that the Court could use the Establishment Clause as one of several routes to strike down 
Proposition 8 and other gay marriage bans). 
 80. See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches 
and Their History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275, 339 (2006) (“The Establishment Clause and Free 
Exercise jurisprudence of the Court appears to be converging on a standard of neutrality—one 
that accepts ‘neutral laws of general applicability’ regardless of whether they incidentally 
burden free exercise and advocates only the ‘principle of neutrality’ in allocating benefits to 
religious groups.” (footnote omitted)). Thomas Jefferson famously described the First 
Amendment as “building a wall of separation between Church & State.” Thomas Jefferson, 
Letter to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/
danpre.html; see also JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 760 (Library of Am. 1999) (describing the 
separation of church and state as “[s]trongly guarded”). 
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prayer,81 the Ten Commandments,82 and Christmas decorations,83 for 
example—from the public square. Courts have, however, left intact 
symbols that, taken together, do not endorse one religion or set of 
beliefs over another84—the “religious pluralism”85 approach, we might 
call it. The Courts have also protected the rights of religious groups to 
express their beliefs as they see fit.86 The result has been a neutral 
state and a wide range of private choice.87 Establishment Clause 
 
 81. See Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 317 (2000) (holding that prayers 
at public school football games violate the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 599 (1992) (holding that prayers led at public school graduation ceremonies violate the 
Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985) (holding that a public 
school’s “period of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer” violates the Establishment 
Clause) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 60 (“Such an 
endorsement is not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a 
course of complete neutrality toward religion.”). 
 82. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 844, 881 (2005) (affirming a preliminary 
injunction against a courthouse’s public display of the Ten Commandments); see also id. at 885 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In my opinion, the display at issue was an establishment of religion 
in violation of our Constitution.”). 
 83. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989) (holding that a nativity 
scene displayed on the steps of a county courthouse violates the Establishment Clause). 
 84. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (plurality opinion) (upholding a 
state capitol’s display of many historical monuments, one of which featured the Ten 
Commandments); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 578–79 (upholding a city’s display of a 
menorah, Christmas tree, and sign saluting liberty). 
 85. See, e.g., Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose if You Choose Not to Play: Toward a 
More Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 65 (2006) 
(“Government action becomes ‘practically coercive’ when it creates a substantial threat to 
religious pluralism or of suppressing religious differences.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Essay, 
Truth and Consequences: Mitt Romney, Proposition 8, and Public Reason, 61 ALA. L. REV. 337, 
349 (2010) (describing religious pluralism in the United States). 
 86. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524, 527–
28 (1993) (holding that a prohibition on religious ritualistic animal sacrifice violates the Free 
Exercise Clause); id. at 523 (“The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress 
religious belief or practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our 
opinions.”). The Court has held, however, that the state may enact religion-neutral regulations 
that incidentally burden the free exercise of religion. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 
(“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a 
neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free 
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections . . . .”). 
 87. See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant 
First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 24 (2010) (“In modern Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, for example, the Court for many years identified ‘separation of church and state’ 
as its guiding principle and frequently applied ‘strict scrutiny’ to laws that burdened the right of 
Free Exercise. Over time, however, dissatisfaction erupted with separationism’s perceived 
hostility to religion, and the Court sought more neutral approaches to the Religion Clauses.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
CHANDERSON IN FINAL.DOC 3/2/2011  1:25:58 PM 
1428 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1413 
jurisprudence in particular recognizes the state as a potentially 
coercive power in shaping others’ beliefs and in affecting the 
treatment of minorities;88 accordingly, it demands that the state stay 
out,89 so that others can determine their own religious beliefs without 
coercion.90 
The Court’s approach to gay rights—demanding state neutrality 
as to the morality or immorality of homosexuality—serves essentially 
the same principles. It seeks to protect gay individuals from judgment 
at the official level, while protecting the right of private individuals 
and organizations to make those judgments themselves. As with the 
Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence, this approach removes state 
coercion, thus creating a more level playing field than would exist if 
the state were free to take sides.91 
In both contexts, the Court has taken a fact-based approach, 
concentrating particularly on the practical effects of state actions and 
claimed rights. Therefore, although a public accommodations law 
protecting gay persons may be unobjectionable in general, the state 
may not use it to force private groups to convey a message of 
approval of homosexuality. An organization whose message is not 
altered, however, may not receive similar First Amendment 
protection. The state’s police power, broad though it is, cannot be 
 
 88. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 n.51 (1985) (“[T]his Court has noted that ‘[w]hen 
the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious 
belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing 
officially approved religion is plain.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962))). 
 89. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 593–94 (“Whether the key word is ‘endorsement,’ 
‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, 
at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of 
religious belief . . . .”). It is worth noting that in individual cases, the Court is not always 
completely faithful to this general principle. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology 
Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing 
the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 156 (2004) (arguing that, “from a perspective of substantive 
neutrality,” state-funded scholarships for theology students should be constitutional and the 
religious language in the Pledge of Allegiance should be unconstitutional). 
 90. See Laycock, supra note 89, at 244 (“Because government is very large, its influence 
will rarely be zero.”); id. (“[R]eligious liberty is best protected from government influence by 
nondiscriminatory protection of religious and secular private speech, and by government 
making no statements that depend on views about religious truth. The Court has approached 
this ideal in the speech cases; private religious speech is fully protected and government 
religious speech is almost fully prohibited.” (footnote omitted)). 
 91. See, e.g., id. at 243 (“Minimizing government influence provides a criterion for defining 
neutrality: government departs from neutrality when it does things that tend to influence private 
religious choice.”). 
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used to target gays and lesbians for disfavored treatment any more 
than it can be used to favor them. As with cases under the religion 
clauses, the Court’s preferred balance has boiled down to state 
neutrality, and that neutrality depends on the circumstances of the 
case.92 
II.  THE FAILURES OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE REVIEW: STATE 
COURT OPINIONS REPEAT ASSUMPTIONS AND DIVIDED BELIEFS 
The neutrality approach developed by the Supreme Court since 
the mid-1990s balances equal recognition of the constitutional rights 
of gay persons with the rights of other individuals to disapprove of 
homosexuality. As described in the preceding Part, the Court has 
invalidated state bans on certain expressions of anti-gay sentiment—
in Hurley and Boy Scouts93—just as readily as it has struck down laws 
burdening the rights of gay persons.94 The balance is a careful one; in 
both lines of cases, the Court thoroughly examined the facts to 
determine whether the law furthered a legitimate state interest, or 
instead served to promote or burden a particular side. Critical to that 
examination was a somewhat more exacting level of scrutiny—on 
display in Romer and Lawrence—that failed to accept an asserted 
interest that did not appear to be supported by the facts.95 
The Supreme Court has yet to apply that command of state 
neutrality to the most socially contentious gay rights issue yet: same-
sex marriage.96 The Court has not had occasion to consider the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans since 1972, when it 
dismissed a challenge “for want of substantial federal question.”97 
Instead, the action has taken place in the state courts. Since 2003, 
when the Court decided Lawrence v. Texas—widely regarded as the 
 
 92. See generally id. (describing the role of neutrality in religion cases). 
 93. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 94. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 95. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a 
law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more 
searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“The breadth of the amendment is so far 
removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. . . . It is a 
status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a 
relationship to legitimate state interests . . . .”); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (describing the Court’s analysis as “an unheard-of form of rational-basis review”). 
 96. Recent polls suggest that the nation remains closely divided over same-sex marriage. 
See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 97. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (mem.). 
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turning point in the Court’s treatment of gay men and lesbians98—
appellate courts in ten states have ruled on same-sex marriage bans.99 
This Part briefly considers the institutional role of courts when they 
decide controversial issues. It then looks at the decisions of these ten 
state courts and argues that they failed to fulfill that role. Instead of 
serving the ideals of neutral factfinders, those courts largely took the 
opposite approach, proceeding from the judges’ own values and 
assumptions. This approach provides a sharp contrast to the approach 
described in Part III, in which the federal district court in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger carefully reviewed the evidence presented after a full 
trial. 
A.  The Institutional Role of Courts in Deciding Socially 
Controversial Cases 
This Note does not attempt to address the question of whether 
courts should be deciding controversial cases in general. As a 
normative matter, much literature has debated that question.100 As a 
descriptive matter, courts do in fact take up the controversial issues of 
the day—school desegregation,101 abortion,102 and flag burning,103 to 
name a few. Though the Court has taken its share of criticism for 
getting too involved,104 some of the cases most criticized today are 
 
 98. See, e.g., Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 
1616–17 (2004) (“The recognition by the Supreme Court of the United States that lesbians and 
gay men are human beings who have ‘dignity as free persons’ that is deserving of ‘full’ 
constitutional respect is itself a monumental breakthrough. Lawrence is the first Supreme Court 
decision in American history that openly acknowledges this.” (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
578)). 
 99. Eight of the ten decisions came from the states’ respective courts of last resort. The 
Indiana decision came from a three-judge panel of the state court of appeals. Morrison v. 
Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005). The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review a 
decision by a three-judge panel of that state’s court of appeals. Standhardt v. Maricopa Cnty. 
Super. Ct., No. CV-03-0422-PR, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62 (Ariz. May 25, 2004). 
 100. See Adler, supra note 7, at 150 (“Of course, in legal discourse, the whole idea of judicial 
competence and its limits is routine.”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: 
Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 6 (2005) 
(“[C]onstitutional scholars have produced an enormity of scholarship analyzing the proper 
function of the federal courts in a democratic society.”). See generally Hutchinson, supra, at 6 
(describing theories of the role of the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian body). 
 101. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 102. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 103. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 104. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support 
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005). 
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ones in which the Court merely upheld the status quo.105 More to the 
point, the Court has already shown itself willing to decide gay rights 
cases and has established principles to guide its decisions in such 
cases.106 
In controversial decisions—and in the case of same-sex marriage 
specifically—legislatures and courts play vastly different roles. 
Because legislatures are supposed to reflect the will of the electorate, 
legislators’ main concern should be whether the people of their state 
or region want legalized same-sex marriage. In contrast, courts are 
not directly tied to popular demands. Federal court judges are 
constitutionally insulated from outside control.107 Many state court 
judges, meanwhile, are subject to popular election,108 but even in 
elected states judges serve roles distinct from legislatures. The 
Washington Supreme Court, for example, describes its role as 
“protect[ing] the liberties guaranteed by the constitution and laws of 
the state of Washington and the United States; impartially 
uphold[ing] and interpret[ing] the law; and provid[ing] open, just, and 
timely resolution of all matters.”109 
 
 105. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 552 (1896) (upholding a law mandating 
segregation based on race); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (upholding a state’s 
denial to women of licenses to practice law); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
216, 223–34 (1944) (holding that although strict scrutiny was required to justify internment of 
Japanese Americans, the government had met its burden based on military necessity). 
 106. See supra Part I. 
 107. Federal court judges are unelected, protecting them from popular demands, and they 
receive life tenure and salary protection, protecting them from the other branches. See ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 4 (5th ed. 2007). 
 108. See id. at 4–5 (“In thirty-eight states, state court judges are subject to some form of 
electoral review. Some contend that this difference makes federal courts uniquely suited for the 
protection of constitutional rights.”) (footnotes omitted). Critics emphatically assert that state 
judicial elections should be reformed or rejected precisely because existing electoral systems 
weaken judges’ abilities to fulfill their intended roles. See, e.g., Editorial, Putting a Halt to 
Judicial Elections, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/11/04/AR2010110407139.html (arguing that judicial elections should be rejected 
because judges “should not be swayed by the political whims of the day, nor should they be 
made to think twice about making principled but controversial decisions for fear that they could 
lose their jobs”); Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 
22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/opinion/23oconnor.html (“When you enter one of 
these courtrooms, the last thing you want to worry about is whether the judge is more 
accountable to a campaign contributor or an ideological group than to the law.”). For a brief 
discussion of Iowa’s judicial elections after the state supreme court found that gay marriage was 
constitutionally required, see infra note 149. 
 109. Your Supreme Court in Action, WASH. CTS., http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_
courts/supremecourt (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). Washington Supreme Court justices are elected 
to six-year terms. Judicial Voter Pamphlet, WASH. CTS., http://www.courts.wa.gov/voters (last 
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The results in gay marriage decisions do not reflect the courts’ 
unique institutional roles, however, as state court judges are split 
roughly the same way as the electorate. In public discourse, the 
debate over how—or whether—to legally recognize same-sex couples 
is a close one. In a 2010 CNN poll, 48 percent of respondents believed 
that homosexual relationships were “morally wrong,” 50 percent said 
they were “not a moral issue,” and 2 percent were “unsure.”110 One 
website collecting several nationwide polls revealed that between 44 
and 52 percent of 2010 poll respondents believed same-sex marriage 
should be legal, when the question posed a dichotomous choice 
between legal and not legal.111 The results changed markedly when 
civil unions were introduced as a third option, with respondents split 
fairly equally across the three answers: supporting marriage, only civil 
unions, or nothing at all.112 
State court judges are similarly divided. Between the Supreme 
Court’s 2003 Lawrence decision and the California district court’s 
2010 Perry decision, ten state appeals or supreme courts have issued 
gay marriage opinions interpreting their own state constitutions. Of 
those, five found that same-sex couples are guaranteed no formal 
recognition of their relationships under their state constitutions,113 
four found that their state constitutions require recognition of same-
 
visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
 110. CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, conducted Feb. 12–15, 2010 (surveying 1,023 
adults nationwide), reported at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm. 
 111. See CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, conducted Aug. 6–10, 2010 (surveying 
1,009 adults nationwide and finding, in asking two slightly different variations of the question, 
that 49 or 52 percent of respondents believed in a constitutional right to same-sex marriage); 
Gallup Poll, conducted May 3–6, 2010 (surveying 1,029 adults nationwide and finding that 44 
percent supported same-sex marriage); ABC News/Washington Post Poll, conducted Feb. 4–8, 
2010 (surveying 1,004 adults nationwide and finding that 47 percent of respondents supported 
the legalization of gay marriage). All polls are reported at PollingReport.com, http://www.
pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
 112. See FOX News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, conducted Aug. 10–11, 2010 (surveying 900 
registered voters nationwide and finding that 37 percent of respondents supported legalized gay 
marriage, 29 percent supported another legal partnership, and 28 percent supported no legal 
recognition); CBS News Poll, conducted Aug. 20–24, 2010 (surveying 1,082 adults nationwide 
and finding that 40 percent of respondents supported legalized gay marriage, 30 percent 
supported civil unions, and 25 percent supported no legal recognition). Both polls are reported 
at PollingReport.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
 113. Standhardt v. Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 463–64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); 
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. App. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635 
(Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 
P.3d 963, 1010 (Wash. 2006). 
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sex marriage,114 and one found that its state constitution requires 
awarding equal rights and benefits—through marriage or some other 
institution—to same-sex couples.115 Despite the highly controversial 
nature of the claims, all ten courts reviewed the constitutionality of 
the bans strictly as a matter of law. None of the ten state courts held 
full trials,116 and only one—the Iowa Supreme Court—had the benefit 
of a developed evidentiary record, in the form of depositions and 
exhibits submitted to the trial court before summary judgment, to 
inform its decision.117 
B.  State Court Decisions Fail to Reflect the Supreme Court’s 
Balanced Approach 
1. Courts That Rejected a Right to Same-Sex Marriage Simply 
Deferred to the Legislatures’ Asserted State Interests.  Courts in 
Arizona, Indiana, Maryland, New York, and Washington all reviewed 
the constitutionality of their states’ gay marriage bans as a matter of 
law.118 The five courts that upheld their states’ bans all relied on the 
same crucial assumptions—without any critical analysis—in rejecting 
the plaintiffs’ claims under rational basis review.119 In defending their 
laws, the states claimed that restricting marriage to opposite-sex 
 
 114. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
 115. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006). 
 116. See infra notes 118, 134–35. 
 117. See infra note 135. 
 118. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 454 (accepting special action jurisdiction without a trial); 
Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 18 (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint); Conaway, 932 
A.2d at 584, 635 (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs); 
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 5 (reviewing the trial courts’ grants of summary judgment and 
affirming the appellate court’s judgment for the state); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 971, 1010 
(reversing the trial courts’ grants of summary judgment for the plaintiffs). The dissenters on the 
Maryland court recommended remanding the case for a trial on the facts rather than issuing a 
decision as a matter of law. Conaway, 932 A.2d at 693 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). 
 119. The Washington court relied more heavily on the legislature’s freedom to make those 
assumptions, rather than the court’s own insistence that they were true. See Andersen, 138 P.3d 
at 983 (“The rational basis standard of review is ‘highly deferential to the legislature.’ As noted, 
under this standard any conceivable set of facts may be considered that support the 
classification drawn, and over–[ ]and under–inclusiveness generally does not foreclose finding a 
rational basis for legislation.” (citation omitted)); id. (“We reiterate that the rational basis 
standard is a highly deferential standard.”); id. at 984 (“And at the risk of sounding 
monotonous, we repeat that the rational basis standard is extremely deferential.”). 
Nevertheless, the same assumptions were at play—without any critical analysis—throughout the 
opinion. 
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couples served the states’ interests in fostering responsible 
procreation and child rearing. The courts willingly accepted these 
asserted interests, finding that the exclusion of same-sex couples was 
rationally related to protecting the interests asserted for opposite-sex 
couples.120 In agreeing with the states, the courts made two critical 
assumptions, unsupported by facts: that the state-conferred benefits 
of marriage are enough to cabin the allegedly irresponsible behavior 
of heterosexual couples, and that same-sex couples would not benefit 
from those same rights and benefits. 
These courts’ first assumption defies common sense. All five of 
the courts, in one form or another, found it important that 
heterosexual intercourse—and not same-sex intercourse—may 
naturally produce offspring.121 The courts further found that 
“accidents . . . happen”122 all too often among heterosexuals, and that 
those accidents could be of particular concern to state legislatures.123 
 
 120. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 463–64 (“We hold that the State has a legitimate interest in 
encouraging procreation and child-rearing within the marital relationship, and that limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to that interest.”); Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 
35 (“[O]pposite-sex marriage furthers the legitimate state interest in encouraging opposite-sex 
couples to procreate responsibly and have and raise children within a stable environment.”); 
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 633 (“[T]he fundamental right to marriage and its ensuing benefits are 
conferred on opposite-sex couples not because of a distinction between whether various 
opposite-sex couples actually procreate, but rather because of the possibility of procreation.”); 
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“[T]here are at least two grounds that rationally support the 
limitation on marriage that the Legislature has enacted. Others have been advanced, but we will 
discuss only these two, both of which are derived from the undisputed assumption that marriage 
is important to the welfare of children.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983 (“[T]he legislature was 
entitled to believe that providing that only opposite-sex couples may marry will encourage 
procreation and child-rearing in a ‘traditional’ nuclear family where children tend to thrive.”). 
 121. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462 (“Indisputably, the only sexual relationship capable of 
producing children is one between a man and a woman.”); Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24 (“All that 
is required is one instance of sexual intercourse with a man for a woman to become pregnant.”); 
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 630–31 (“This ‘inextricable link’ between marriage and procreation 
reasonably could support the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman only, 
because it is that relationship that is capable of producing biological offspring of both 
members . . . .”); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency 
to lead to the birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982 
(accepting the legislature’s justification that only opposite-sex couples can create, without third-
party involvement, children who are biologically related to the parents). 
 122. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123. See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11 (“A person’s preference for the sort of sexual 
activity that cannot lead to the birth of children is relevant to the State’s interest in fostering 
relationships that will serve children best.”); id. at 21 (Graffeo, J., concurring) (“Since marriage 
was instituted to address the fact that sexual contact between a man and a woman naturally can 
result in pregnancy and childbirth, the Legislature’s decision to focus on opposite-sex couples is 
understandable.”). 
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The courts assumed that the state legislatures’ provisions of marital 
rights and benefits would turn those instances of “casual 
intercourse”124 into long-term, stable relationships.125 The courts’ 
hypothesized chain of events seems unlikely. It is hard to believe that 
many persons engaging in the sort of casual sex described by the 
courts—the people who don’t plan ahead, who conceive children 
based on “momentary” fits of unprotected passion126—would be so 
motivated by the tax breaks and other state-conferred benefits of 
marriage127 that they would enter into a permanent relationship with 
their one-night-stand partners.128 
These courts’ decisions might be more persuasive if heterosexual 
couples were the only ones bearing and raising children, but that is 
not the case. The decisions thus also assumed that although gay 
persons are parenting, they do not need the same incentives to stay 
committed after they have children together.129 In contrast to their 
accident-prone heterosexual counterparts, the assumption goes, 
“[m]embers of a same-sex couple who wish to have a child . . . have 
already demonstrated their commitment to child-rearing, by virtue of 
the difficulty of obtaining a child through adoption or assisted 
reproduction, without the State necessarily having to encourage that 
 
 124. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125. See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (majority opinion) (finding that the state could 
rationally “choose to offer an inducement—in the form of marriage and its attendant benefits—
to opposite-sex couples who make a solemn, long-term commitment to each other”). 
 126. Id. at 21 (Graffeo, J., concurring). 
 127. See, e.g., id. at 6–7 (majority opinion) (describing “significant tax advantages, rights in 
probate and intestacy proceedings, rights to support from their spouses both during the 
marriage and after it is dissolved, and rights to be treated as family members in obtaining 
insurance coverage and making health care decisions”). 
 128. This argument and its variations have drawn their share of critics. One critic called the 
New York decision “desperate” and noted that the court apparently thought gays were “too 
good for marriage.” Kenji Yoshino, Too Good for Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A19; 
see also Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 31 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (“[N]o one rationally decides to 
have children because gays and lesbians are excluded from marriage.”); Dan Savage, Same-Sex 
Marriage Wins by Losing, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (“In New York, 
the court ruled in effect that irresponsible heterosexuals often have children by accident—we 
gay couples, in contrast, cannot get drunk and adopt in one night—so the state can reserve 
marriage rights for heterosexuals in order to coerce them into taking care of their offspring. 
Without the promise of gift registries and rehearsal dinners, it seems, many more newborns in 
New York would be found in trash cans.”). 
 129. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 21–22 (Graffeo, J., concurring) (“Although many same-
sex couples share these family objectives and are competently raising children in a stable 
environment, they are simply not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples in this regard given 
the intrinsic differences in the assisted reproduction or adoption processes that most 
homosexual couples rely on to have children.”). 
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commitment through the institution of marriage.”130 The courts did 
not attempt to explain why parents would have any less interest in 
ongoing stability merely because their child was planned, rather than 
an accident. As the dissent noted in the New York case, same-sex 
couples in the state were already raising “tens of thousands of 
children,” and “[d]epriving [those] children of the benefits and 
protections available to the children of opposite-sex couples is 
antithetical to their welfare, as defendants do not dispute.”131 Rather 
than applauding same-sex couples’ child planning and providing them 
with additional stability, these courts instead punished them for it.132 
The assertion that same-sex couples do not need any extra stability is 
all the more perplexing given the propensity of gay marriage 
opponents to attack gay couples as being unstable and thus unworthy 
of marriage.133 
2. Courts Striking Down Gay Marriage Bans Assumed, Rather 
than Showed, the Equality of Same-Sex Couples.  The supreme courts 
of Iowa, Connecticut, California, and Massachusetts all found that 
bans on same-sex marriage violated their respective state 
constitutions. Like the courts that upheld their states’ bans, these 
courts considered the controversial question without the benefit of 
 
 130. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 26 (Ind. App. 2005); see also Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 
at 7 (majority opinion) (finding that because same-sex couples, unlike opposite-sex couples, can 
only “become parents by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other technological marvels,” 
the “rationale for marriage does not apply with comparable force to same-sex couples”). 
 131. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 32 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
 132. See Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes Out 
of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355, 422 (2006) (“The [Morrison] court rather 
ironically concluded that, because same-sex couples who create families through artificial 
reproduction or adoption ‘have invested the significant time, effort, and expense’ to do so, they 
are more likely to provide a stable environment for their children without the protections of 
marriage.” (quoting Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24–25)); cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the 
Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 817 (1998) (“[A] reform that favors one 
type of family by disfavoring another penalizes those who do not, and perhaps cannot, conform 
to the ideal. When those wounded are the children on whose general behalf family-
standardizing reforms are most often said to be justified, this consequence seems especially 
indefensible.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the ‘Conservative Case’ for Same-Sex 
Marriage: Same-Sex Marriage and ‘the Tragedy of the Commons,’ 22 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 441, 453–
55 (arguing that same-sex families are unstable, based on their higher divorce rates in countries 
where they can legally marry); id. at 456 (“It does not appear that giving marital or marriage-
like status to same-sex couples significantly alters their troubling behaviors.”). 
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adversarial trials.134 Only the Iowa court had a developed evidentiary 
record on which to base its conclusions.135 
The decisions involved two questions. The first was whether 
same-sex couples had special characteristics that would justify the 
state treating them differently than opposite-sex couples. The 
Massachusetts court, the only state court that struck down a marriage 
ban under rational basis review,136 held that “[t]he marriage ban works 
a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the 
community for no rational reason.”137 In Connecticut, where civil 
unions had existed since 2005, the state supreme court simply held 
that the state’s contention that the two groups of couples were not 
similarly situated “clearly lacks merit.”138 The court found that the two 
had the same goals for their relationships139 and held that, in passing 
the civil union statute, “the legislature itself recognized the overriding 
similarities between same sex and opposite sex couples.”140 In 
California, which also had a parallel equal-rights scheme, the court 
reached a similar conclusion.141 
The second question was whether the creation of parallel-rights 
schemes—civil unions or domestic partnerships—resolved the 
constitutional infirmity. All four courts held that it did not. Two of 
the states—Connecticut and California—had already enacted parallel 
schemes. The Connecticut court found the difference between 
 
 134. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 403 (Cal. 2008) (noting that the trial court 
“proceeded expeditiously to solicit briefing and conduct a hearing” on which it based its 
judgment); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411–12 (Conn. 2008) (reversing 
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the state); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 
873 (Iowa 2009) (affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 951 (Mass. 2003) (reversing the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the state). 
 135. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 873 (noting that “[t]he record was developed through witness 
affidavits and depositions”). 
 136. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. 
 137. Id. at 968. 
 138. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424. 
 139. See id. (concluding, without support, that same-sex couples “share the same interest in 
a committed and loving relationship as heterosexual persons who wish to marry,” as well as “the 
same interest in having a family and raising their children in a loving and supportive 
environment”). The court neglected to describe any evidence that led to its assertion. Oddly, in 
addition to quoting from the California case, the court cited the New Jersey and Vermont 
cases—both of which held that only civil unions were constitutionally required—in support of its 
holding that the couples were the same. See id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 413 (Cal. 2008). 
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marriage and civil unions to be an “obvious fact.”142 Though a 
discussion of evidence supporting its view could have been 
illuminating, the Connecticut court eschewed that approach. Instead, 
it cited Brown v. Board of Education143 for the proposition that 
separate cannot be equal144 and moved on. Likewise, the California 
court—despite the overwhelming length of its opinion145—did 
surprisingly little to explain why the separate name of domestic 
partnership worked a harm of constitutional magnitude. It gave only 
an unsatisfactory conclusion that domestic partnerships “properly 
must be viewed as impinging upon the right of those couples to have 
their family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that 
accorded the family relationship of opposite-sex couples.”146 
Massachusetts, meanwhile, had no experience with civil unions, 
and the court only addressed them in a second opinion, when it wrote 
an advisory opinion to the legislature stating that parallel schemes 
would not suffice.147 But its first opinion should have been clear 
enough that the court demanded full marriage rights for gays: 
Certainly our decision today marks a significant change in the 
definition of marriage as it has been inherited from the common law, 
and understood by many societies for centuries. But it does not 
disturb the fundamental value of marriage in our society. Here, the 
plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to undermine the institution 
of civil marriage.148 
 
 142. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 419 n.16 (“We do not see how the recently created legal entity of 
civil union possibly can embody the same status as an institution of such long-standing and 
overriding societal importance as marriage. If proof of this obvious fact were necessary, it would 
suffice to point out that the vast majority of heterosexual couples would be unwilling to give up 
their constitutionally protected right to marry in exchange for the bundle of legal rights that the 
legislature has denominated a civil union.”). 
 143. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 144. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418–19. The court also cited the California and Massachusetts 
same-sex marriage cases for the same proposition. Id. (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 
(Cal. 2008); Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004)). 
 145. The majority opinion alone spans seventy pages in the Pacific Reporter. In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d at 384–453. 
 146. Id. at 445. The court then briefly described the uniquely celebrated term “marriage,” 
but failed to give concrete examples—beyond conjecture—explaining why the plaintiffs would 
suffer harm without access to the word alone. See id. at 445–46. 
 147. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 569 (“Segregating same-sex 
unions from opposite-sex unions cannot possibly be held rationally to advance or ‘preserve’ 
what we stated in Goodridge were the Commonwealth’s legitimate interests in procreation, 
child rearing, and the conservation of resources.”). 
 148. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 (Mass. 2003). 
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The narrow majority of judges, in breaking new ground, should have 
taken great care to describe specifically what led them to depart from 
the tradition they acknowledge and to reach a different conclusion 
than both the legislature and their dissenting brethren on the court. 
They failed to do that. 
The Iowa court’s opinion contained the strongest reasoning.149 It 
described the role of the legislature respectfully, but detailed times 
when the Iowa legislature had gotten it wrong, and—rather 
forthrightly—when the U.S. Supreme Court had blundered as well.150 
The beginning of the opinion called the case a “civil rights action” 
and placed the case in a historical progression of equal rights 
movements, contrasting historical discrimination against various 
groups with Iowa’s avowed commitment to equality and liberty.151 It 
reviewed the positions of numerous religious sects on gay marriage, 
found that many sects actually supported it, and explained why the 
courts could not pick one religious view over another.152 The court 
could then have assessed whether the ban served some legitimate 
interest under rational basis review, or if it served only to express 
disapproval of gays. Instead, it turned to heightened scrutiny to 
invalidate the marriage ban.153 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has applied “a more searching 
form of rational basis review” to laws that show “a desire to harm a 
 
 149. Despite the court’s thorough reasoning, Iowa voters either plainly disagreed with the 
decision or believed the justices had overstepped their roles in deciding the issue. In the 2010 
midterm election, voters recalled all three justices who were up for reelection in an 
“unprecedented vote.” A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A1. Nonetheless, voters and legislators seem uninterested in amending 
the state constitution to invalidate the court’s ruling. Jason Hancock, One Year Later, Gay 
Marriage Repeal Appears to Be on Backburner, IOWA INDEPENDENT, Apr. 1, 2010, http://
iowaindependent.com/31160/one-year-later-gay-marriage-repeal-appears-to-be-on-backburner. 
 150. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 877 (Iowa 2009). 
 151. Id. at 872. 
 152. Id. at 904–06. 
 153. See id. at 896 (“Because we conclude Iowa’s same-sex marriage statute cannot 
withstand intermediate scrutiny, we need not decide whether classifications based on sexual 
orientation are subject to a higher level of scrutiny.”). The Connecticut court also used 
heightened (or intermediate) scrutiny. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
423 (Conn. 2008). The California court, which does not use an intermediate level of scrutiny, In 
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435–36 (Cal. 2008), adopted strict scrutiny for classifications 
based on sexual orientation, id. at 446. Only Massachusetts applied rational basis review. 
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. 
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politically unpopular group”154—including gays and lesbians in Romer 
and Lawrence155—the Court has never said that sexual orientation is a 
suspect class.156 The state courts should have exercised the same 
restraint. The Court has adopted a sound principle of state neutrality 
toward approving or disapproving of gay persons, and adoption of a 
heightened level of scrutiny would topple that balance. To declare 
sexual orientation a suspect class would place gays and lesbians in the 
same category as racial and ethnic minorities and women, and would 
“exacerbate[] the public perception that they are seeking special 
rights rather than equal rights.”157 By rejecting that approach, the 
Supreme Court wisely has declined to give gays and lesbians as a class 
the appearance of any legally favored position.158 
3. New Jersey’s Middle Ground Provides Only a Temporary 
Resolution.  In contrast to the other courts discussed, the New Jersey 
court was eager to strike a balance between the two sides. When 
faced with the same question as the other courts,159 the New Jersey 
 
 154. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. (citing 
cases applying the “more searching form” of rational basis review to laws discriminating against 
hippies, unmarried persons, and the mentally disabled). 
 155. See id. (articulating the “more searching” standard in Lawrence and describing the 
Court’s holding in Romer). 
 156. Cf. EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 69 (2d ed. 
2008) (“For all practical purposes the constitutional doctrine regarding suspect classes is a dead 
letter. . . . [T]he Court has no intention of creating any new suspect classes.”). 
 157. Id.; see also id. (arguing that the heightened scrutiny approach carries “political 
liabilities” for gays and lesbians, “fram[ing] their arguments in terms of special pleading rather 
than legal equality”). 
 158. This Note does not dispute the notion that sexual orientation may qualify as a suspect 
or quasi-suspect classification. There are strong arguments that gay persons and same-sex 
couples fit within the Supreme Court’s description of protected class, including arguments in 
cases otherwise criticized in this Note. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 443 (rejecting 
increased political acceptance as a barrier to heightened review and noting that “if a group’s 
current political powerlessness were a prerequisite to a characteristic’s being considered a 
constitutionally suspect basis for differential treatment, it would be impossible to justify the 
numerous decisions that continue to treat sex, race, and religion as suspect classifications”). 
Such recognition, however, would unnecessarily tip the existing balance between state 
nondiscrimination and private rights to disapprove. Because the resolution of same-sex 
marriage rights need not turn on heightened review, see infra Part III.C.2, granting protected 
status in the decisions is particularly unwise. 
 159. Like the other courts, New Jersey’s court decided the case on summary judgment, 
without the benefit of a fully developed record. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 203 (N.J. 2006). 
Like other courts, the New Jersey court also relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, rather than limiting its consideration to its unique state law. See id. at 207 (“In 
attempting to discern those substantive rights that are fundamental under Article I, Paragraph 
1, we have adopted the general standard followed by the United States Supreme Court in 
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court determined that the state constitution required that gay couples 
be given all the same rights and benefits of marriage, but declined to 
order the legislature to adopt the name “marriage.” In reaching its 
decision, the court took pains to describe “[t]he seeming ordinariness 
of plaintiffs’ lives”160—that is, the same as heterosexual couples’—
describing, for example, their jobs and family members.161 It noted the 
disconnect between the “ordinariness” of their lives and “the social 
indignities and economic difficulties that they daily face due to the 
inferior legal standing of their relationships.”162 The court refused to 
consider arguments that heterosexual marriage—and not gay 
marriage—was for procreation and child rearing, as the attorney 
general had disclaimed those interests,163 and accordingly found that 
the state had no reason to exclude same-sex couples from the rights 
and benefits of marriage.164 But the court also found that history and 
tradition did not allow it to declare that the fundamental right to 
marriage applied to same-sex couples.165 
Finally, the court determined that, because the state had no 
experience with civil unions or other parallel schemes, the court 
should not presume that those schemes would violate the state 
constitution.166 It reasoned, “A proper respect for a coordinate branch 
 
construing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution.”). 
 160. Id. at 202; see also id. at 201 (“In terms of the value they place on family, career, and 
community service, plaintiffs lead lives that are remarkably similar to those of opposite-sex 
couples.”). 
 161. Id. at 201–02. 
 162. Id. at 200. The court also observed that gays and lesbians were fully protected against 
discrimination by state law, but only as individuals. See id. (“The statutory and decisional laws 
of this State protect individuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation. When those 
individuals are gays and lesbians who follow the inclination of their sexual orientation and enter 
into a committed relationship with someone of the same sex, our laws treat them, as couples, 
differently than heterosexual couples.”). 
 163. Id. at 205–06, 206 n.7. 
 164. Id. at 220–21. 
 165. See id. at 211 (“Despite the rich diversity of this State, the tolerance and goodness of its 
people, and the many recent advances made by gays and lesbians toward achieving social 
acceptance and equality under the law, we cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so 
deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this State that it ranks as 
a fundamental right.”). 
 166. Id. at 221–22 (“Because this State has no experience with a civil union construct that 
provides equal rights and benefits to same-sex couples, we will not speculate that identical 
schemes called by different names would create a distinction that would offend Article I, 
Paragraph 1. We will not presume that a difference in name alone is of constitutional 
magnitude.”). 
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of government counsels that we defer until it has spoken. . . . [A] 
court must discern not only the limits of its own authority, but also 
when to exercise forbearance . . . .”167 It appears the court was staying 
out of the real firestorm—and saving the big question of gay marriage 
for another day. The decision took a careful balance, in both tone and 
result, and was perhaps the wisest path the court could have followed 
in the case. But as other cases—culminating in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger—reveal, the separate-but-equal fix is merely a 
temporary one, as equal same-sex couples demand to know why they 
should be separate at all. 
III.  TRIAL BY FIRE: RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW IN  
PERRY V. SCHWARZENEGGER 
Under the neutrality principle constructed by the Supreme 
Court, a state may neither adopt a law that exists to disapprove of or 
disadvantage gay persons, nor prevent private actors from expressing 
their disapproval of homosexuality. As argued in Part I, this principle 
strikes a legal balance between two sides in the culture war that 
disagree on whether gay persons are socially and morally equal to 
straight persons. A significant remaining question is how the 
neutrality principle applies to same-sex marriage. 
All too often, those debating same-sex marriage have conflated 
popular approval and the right of persons—or couples—to act as they 
choose.168 The defenders of Proposition 8 claimed that the ban served 
the legitimate interest of protecting “the First Amendment rights of 
individuals and institutions that oppose same-sex marriage on 
religious or moral grounds.”169 But the state-neutrality principle 
requires disentangling popular approval and civil rights. As courts 
have repeatedly recognized, the right to marry is fundamental.170 
 
 167. Id. at 222–23. 
 168. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“‘Legalizing “same-sex marriage” would convey a societal approval of a homosexual lifestyle, 
which the Bible calls sinful and dangerous both to the individuals involved and to society at 
large.’” (quoting Pls.’ Ex. 168, Southern Baptist Convention Resolution on Same-sex 
Marriage)). 
 169. Defendant-Intervenors’ Trial Memorandum at 9, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. C 09-
2292-VRW). 
 170. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“[T]he decision to marry is a 
fundamental right.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of 
fundamental importance to all individuals.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“[T]he 
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
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Though a state may impose some regulations that apply to all couples 
equally, it may not deny a marriage license to a heterosexual couple, 
absent a compelling justification.171 As demonstrated in Part II, 
however, state courts considering states’ obligations to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples have come out all over the map.172 
Almost all of those courts, moreover, have issued decisions based on 
assumptions and unsatisfactory reasoning.173 
In this legal landscape, two same-sex couples—represented by 
experienced constitutional litigators Ted Olson and David Boies—set 
out to settle the law under the federal Constitution.174 The plaintiffs in 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger challenged California’s Proposition 8, which 
amended the state constitution to ban same-sex marriage.175 On 
August 4, 2010, a federal district court struck down the amendment, 
finding that the “[p]laintiffs have demonstrated by overwhelming 
evidence that Proposition 8 violates their [federal] due process and 
equal protection rights and that they will continue to suffer these 
constitutional violations until state officials cease enforcement of 
Proposition 8.”176 
A.  The Road to Perry 
The gay marriage dispute in California is a decade-long story, 
with Perry as the latest stage. In 1999, the California legislature 
adopted a domestic partnership law affording same-sex couples many 
of the same rights and benefits as married heterosexual couples.177 
The next year, voters passed Proposition 22, which amended the 
 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”); see also Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (“The parties 
do not dispute that the right to marry is fundamental.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (applying strict scrutiny to a state law withholding 
marriage licenses from single parents who were deficient on their child support payments). 
 172. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra Part II.B. 
 174. See Eskridge & Spedale, supra note 2 (“Adversaries in Bush v. Gore, Ted Olson and 
David Boies are a power couple of super-lawyers supporting same-sex marriage. Dismayed that 
California voters overrode their state Supreme Court’s guarantee of marriage equality for 
lesbian and gay couples, Boies and Olson have brought a federal constitutional lawsuit to 
invalidate the voters’ action.”). 
 175. See California Marriage Protection Act, Proposition 8 (2008) (codified at CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 7.5) (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”). 
 176. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 177. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 413 (Cal. 2008) (describing the history and 
protections of the 1999 legislation). 
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state’s marriage code to explicitly define civil marriage as the union of 
one man and one woman.178 In 2003, the legislature enacted a 
comprehensive measure providing gays with all the same rights and 
benefits, though without the name “marriage.”179 In 2005 and then 
again in 2007, the legislature approved laws recognizing same-sex 
marriage, both of which Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed,180 
claiming the legislature lacked the authority to override Proposition 
22 without returning it to the voters.181 Gay marriage advocates turned 
to the courts, arguing that separate relationship recognition for gay 
couples violated the California constitution.182 The state supreme 
court agreed,183 and California began issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples in June 2008.184 
Proposition 8 was a voter-driven response to the California 
Supreme Court’s holding. While the case was still under 
consideration, opponents of same-sex marriage had already begun 
preparing a constitutional amendment for the November 4, 2008, 
ballot.185 The amendment, Proposition 8, provided in its entirety, 
“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
 
 178. See California Defense of Marriage Act, Proposition 22 (2000) (codified at CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 308.5 (West 2004)) (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized 
in California.”); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 409–10 (describing voters’ adoption of 
Proposition 22). 
 179. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 414 (describing the purpose and protections of the 
2003 legislation). 
 180. See id. at 410 n.17 (“In 2005 and 2007, the Legislature passed bills that would have 
amended [state law] to permit marriage of same-sex couples . . . . The Governor vetoed both 
measures.”). 
 181. See id. (noting that “[i]n returning the 2005 bill to the Assembly without his signature, 
the Governor stated he believed that Proposition 22 required such legislation to be submitted to 
a vote of the people,” and describing Governor Schwarzenegger’s statements that the issue was 
already pending before the California courts). 
 182. Id. at 398. 
 183. See id. at 453 (“[W]e determine that the language of [the state statute] limiting the 
designation of marriage to a union ‘between a man and a woman’ is unconstitutional and must 
be stricken from the statute, and that the remaining statutory language must be understood as 
making the designation of marriage available both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.”). 
 184. See generally Carla Hall, John M. Glionna & Rich Connell, Finally, the Ritual Is Legally 
Theirs, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2008, at A3 (describing same-sex couples marrying at California 
courthouses). 
 185. See Maura Dolan, Gay Marriage Ban Overturned, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at A1 
(“[T]he scope of the court’s decision could be thrown into question by an initiative already 
heading toward the November ballot. The initiative would amend the state Constitution to 
prohibit same-sex unions. The campaign over that measure began within minutes of the 
decision. . . . Conservative and religious-affiliated groups denounced the decision and pledged to 
bring enough voters to the polls in November to overturn it.”). 
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California.”186 On election day, 52.3 percent of voters approved 
Proposition 8,187 and the state stopped issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples the next day.188 In the six months between the state 
supreme court’s decision and the November 4 vote, approximately 
eighteen thousand licenses were issued to same-sex couples;189 
following another trip to the state supreme court, those licenses 
remain valid.190 After Proposition 8, however, same-sex couples 
seeking to wed in California must now seek domestic partnership 
licenses instead. 
In May 2009, two same-sex couples applied for and were denied 
marriage licenses, and filed suit in federal district court. Unlike the 
plaintiffs in state courts, who had argued that the bans violated their 
respective state constitutions, the plaintiffs in Perry argued that 
Proposition 8 violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying same-sex couples the right 
to marry191 and by creating an impermissible classification based on 
sexual orientation.192 Remarkably, though the governor and other 
state actors were the named defendants, they refused to defend 
 
 186. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 187. See DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 
4, 2008 GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/
2008_general/index.htm#sov (follow “SOV—Complete” hyperlink) (showing that Proposition 8 
passed with 52.3 percent of the vote, with 7,001,084 voters approving the amendment and 
6,401,482 voting against it). 
 188. See Complaint ¶ 29, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2009) (No. 09-2292), 
2009 WL 1490740 (“Since November 5, 2008, same-sex couples have been denied marriage 
licenses on account of Prop. 8.”). 
 189. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997; Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 121 (Cal. 2009). 
 190. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 122 (“Proposition 8 does not apply retroactively and 
therefore . . . the marriages of same-sex couples performed prior to the effective date of 
Proposition 8 remain valid.”). 
 191. See Complaint, supra note 188, ¶ 39 (“Prop. 8 impinges on fundamental liberties by 
denying gay and lesbian individuals the opportunity to marry civilly and enter into the same 
officially sanctioned family relationship with their loved ones as opposite-sex individuals.”). The 
Supreme Court has recognized marriage as a fundamental right in numerous cases. See, e.g., 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“Although Loving arose in the context of racial 
discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of 
fundamental importance for all individuals.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(describing marriage as a “vital personal right[]”). 
 192. See Complaint, supra note 188, ¶ 42 (“California law treats similarly-situated people 
differently by providing civil marriage to heterosexual couples, but not to gay and lesbian 
couples. Instead, California law affords them and their families only the separate-but-unequal 
status of domestic partnership. . . . By purposefully denying civil marriage to gay and lesbian 
individuals, California’s ban on same-sex marriage discriminates on the basis of sexual 
orientation.”). 
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Proposition 8;193 the state attorney general even agreed with the 
plaintiffs that the amendment violated the U.S. Constitution.194 Left 
without the state on their side, the principal proponents of 
Proposition 8 petitioned to intervene to defend the amendment and 
were allowed to do so,195 “provid[ing] a vigorous defense of the 
constitutionality of Proposition 8”196 in the state’s absence. 
B.  The Trial over Proposition 8: Testing Rationality 
The proceedings in Perry were unlike those in the state courts.197 
Before the Perry trial began, the defendants alone moved for 
summary judgment; the district court denied it, finding that “[t]he 
parties’ positions . . . raised significant disputed factual questions.”198 
As a result, in contrast to the state cases’ summary proceedings, Perry 
included “significant discovery,” opening and closing statements, and 
a ten-day adversarial presentation of the evidence.199 
At trial, the plaintiffs presented a host of witnesses. Nine expert 
witnesses—historians, economists, psychologists, a social 
epidemiologist, and a political scientist—testified on the purpose and 
meaning of marriage, the effects of same-sex marriage on the 
institution of marriage, and the effects of bans on same-sex marriage 
on same-sex couples and their children.200 They further testified that 
marriage is founded on the affection of two people—not necessarily 
one man and one woman,201 that the state has an interest in marriage 
because it encourages stable households,202 and that there are no 
 
 193. See Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The 
defendant Governor, state administrative officers, and county clerks declined to take any 
position on the constitutionality of Prop. 8.”); see also Dolan, supra note 185 (“Gov. Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, who previously has vetoed two bills in favor of gay marriage, issued a 
statement saying he ‘respects’ the California Supreme Court’s decision and ‘will not support an 
amendment to the constitution that would overturn’ it.”). 
 194. See Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d at 949 (“The defendant California 
Attorney General responded that he agreed that Prop. 8 was unconstitutional.”). 
 195. See id. at 949–50 (“The district court granted an unopposed motion to intervene by the 
Official Proponents of Prop. 8 and ProtectMarriage.com—a ballot committee under California 
law (together, ‘the Proponents’)—so that they could defend the constitutionality of Prop. 8.”). 
 196. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 197. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 198. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 932. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at 940–44 (describing the qualifications and testimony of the witnesses). 
 201. Id. at 933. 
 202. Id. 
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relevant differences between same-sex and opposite-sex couples that 
justify the state separating them for purposes of marriage.203 The 
expert testimony put marriage in its social context: it sought to show 
what marriage really is in modern America, challenging the 
proponents’ assertion—prominently relied upon by state courts that 
have upheld same-sex marriage bans204—that marriage serves 
primarily to regulate natural (meaning, heterosexual) procreation.205 
Seven lay witnesses, including the four plaintiffs (two same-sex 
couples), also testified for the plaintiffs.206 While the expert testimony 
gave the court social context by describing the general effects of bans 
on same-sex marriage, the lay witnesses added the human element, 
describing the personal effects of Proposition 8 on their lives.207 The 
couples testified in detail about the state-conferred legitimacy that 
marriage licenses provide to committed straight couples and about 
how that is absent from the parallel domestic partnerships created for 
gay couples. One of the plaintiff couples described their children,208 
and the other described their plans to have children after marriage.209 
To illustrate the Proposition 8 proponents’ actual motivations in 
pursuing passage of the amendment, the plaintiffs called Hak-Shing 
William Tam as an adverse witness to discuss his role in the 
Proposition 8 campaign.210 In an organized partnership with the 
amendment’s official proponents, Tam distributed information—
particularly to Asian and Pacific Islander communities and through 
 
 203. Id. at 934–35. 
 204. See supra note 120. 
 205. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 931–32 (describing proponents’ argument that procreation 
is central to marriage). 
 206. Id. at 938–40. In addition to the four plaintiffs, the lay witnesses were a partner to 
another same-sex couple who testified about “her experiences with discrimination and about 
how her life changed when she married her wife in 2008”; the mayor of San Diego, a former 
opponent of same-sex marriage, who testified about “how he came to believe that domestic 
partnerships are discriminatory”; and a gay man who “testified about his experience as a 
teenager whose parents placed him in therapy to change his sexual orientation from homosexual 
to heterosexual.” Id. at 939–40. The plaintiffs also called an eighth lay witness, an adverse 
witness who testified about the Proposition 8 campaign. Id. at 940; see also infra notes 210–13 
and accompanying text. 
 207. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 932–38. 
 208. See Transcript of Proceedings at 139, ¶¶ 6–9, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. C 09-
2292-VRW), available at http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Perry-Vol-1-1-11-10.
pdf (describing one couple’s sons); id. at 141, ¶¶ 22–24 (“I want to have a stable and secure 
relationship with her that then we can include our children in.”). 
 209. See id. at 89, ¶¶ 17–18 (“[T]he timeline for us has always been marriage first, before 
family.”). 
 210. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 940. 
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the website 1man1woman.net—to encourage votes for the 
amendment.211 Some of the information he distributed was that 
“homosexuals are twelve times more likely to molest children,” that 
gay marriage “will cause states one-by-one to fall into Satan’s hands,” 
and that gay marriage is related to polygamy and incest.212 The 
sources he cited for this information were the National Association 
for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality—a gay-conversion 
organization—and “the internet.”213 
The Proposition 8 proponents set out to show that the ban served 
a legitimate governmental purpose and was not, contrary to the 
plaintiffs’ claims, adopted to discriminate against gay persons. Like 
the plaintiffs, the proponents of Proposition 8 were represented by 
experienced and accomplished constitutional counsel.214 In opening 
statements, the proponents asserted that the evidence would show 
that marriage is for procreation and that same-sex marriage would 
pose a direct threat to the institution of marriage. The evidence, 
however, did not live up to the proponents’ promises. They offered 
only two witnesses,215 and the court noted that “[p]roponents’ 
evidentiary presentation was dwarfed by that of plaintiffs.”216 The 
court further noted that the proponents “elected not to call the 
majority of their designated witnesses to testify,” and that “[t]he 
record does not reveal the reason behind proponents’ failure to call 
their expert witnesses.”217 
 
 211. See id. at 937 (summarizing testimony). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Prop. 8 Trial Defense Attorney: Charles Cooper, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2010, 
9:24 PM PST), http://www.mercurynews.com/samesexmarriage/ci_14168885 (“A former 
Assistant Attorney General during the Reagan administration, Charles Cooper is part of the 
same conservative Washington, D.C. legal establishment as Olson. He was enlisted to . . . lead 
the legal defense of Prop[.] 8 by the ballot measure’s California sponsors, with assistance from 
the Alliance Defense Fund, a group aligned against gay marriage.”). 
 215. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 945. 
 216. Id. at 932. 
 217. Id. at 944. The proponents initially said plans to record the trial made their witnesses 
“extremely concerned about their personal safety.” Id. The court noted, however, that the 
“potential for public broadcast in the case had been eliminated” well before the proponents’ 
presentation of their case began, and the proponents still did not call the planned witnesses. Id. 
The court further suggested the proponents may have had substantive reasons for withdrawing 
some witnesses, noting that the “[p]laintiffs entered into evidence the deposition testimony of 
two of proponents’ withdrawn witnesses, as their testimony supported plaintiffs’ claims.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
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The two experts that the proponents did call were the founder 
and president of the Institute for American Values—a think tank 
focusing on “marriage, family, and child well-being”218—and a 
professor of government.219 The first expert argued that the 
recognition of same-sex marriage would weaken, or 
deinstitutionalize, marriage.220 He testified that marriage may only be 
between one man and one woman and that it exists for the purpose of 
channeling procreation.221 Accordingly, he argued that the state has an 
interest in differentiating between opposite-sex couples—many of 
whom can procreate naturally and choose to do so—and same-sex 
couples, who cannot procreate naturally.222 The government professor 
testified on the relative political power of gays and lesbians,223 
primarily speaking to the level of scrutiny that the court should 
employ rather than to the interests furthered by the amendment.224 
C.  The District Court’s Opinion 
1. Credibility Determinations.  In a social controversy in which 
passions, stereotypes, and misinformation abound,225 the factfinder’s 
responsibility to make credibility determinations is a crucial 
complement to the adversarial system in a court’s quest to discover 
the truth. In contrast to the state court opinions, which often relied on 
the same assumptions thrown around in public discourse,226 the Perry 
trial forced scrutiny of all of the evidence presented, through vigorous 
 
 218. Id. at 945. 
 219. Id. at 950–51. 
 220. Id. at 934, 949. 
 221. Id. at 933. 
 222. See id. at 947 (noting the expert’s assertion that “the primary purpose of marriage is to 
‘regulate filiation’”). 
 223. Id. at 951. 
 224. See id. at 950–52 (summarizing the testimony of an expert regarding gays’ and lesbians’ 
political power). Some state courts had held that political power defeats gays’ and lesbians’ 
claims to suspect-class status. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974–75 (Wash. 
2006) (“The enactment of provisions providing increased protections to gay and lesbian 
individuals in Washington shows that as a class gay and lesbian persons are not powerless but, 
instead, exercise increasing political power. . . . We conclude that plaintiffs have not established 
that they satisfy the third prong of the suspect classification test.”). 
 225. See, e.g., Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 982–83 (“Well-known stereotypes about gay men and 
lesbians include a belief that gays and lesbians are affluent, self-absorbed and incapable of 
forming long-term intimate relationships. Other stereotypes imagine gay men and lesbians as 
disease vectors or as child molesters who recruit young children into homosexuality. No 
evidence supports these stereotypes.”). 
 226. See supra Part II.B. 
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cross examinations and the court’s thorough assessments of the 
witnesses’ credibility. The Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish 
between lay-witness and expert testimony. Lay witnesses must have 
firsthand knowledge of the subjects of their testimony but need not 
have specialized or technical knowledge or training.227 In contrast, 
experts need not have firsthand knowledge of the particular subjects 
on which they testify228—that is, their knowledge may be obtained 
through reports prepared by others229—but the Rules require courts to 
screen an expert’s knowledge and qualifications in his field.230 The 
Rules thus prevent courts from considering mere conjecture by 
witnesses who are not qualified to give informed opinions. 
The Proposition 8 proponents did not object to the qualifications 
of any of the plaintiffs’ lay or expert witnesses,231 and the court found 
that all of them had presented credible testimony.232 The plaintiffs, in 
contrast, challenged the credibility of both of the proponents’ expert 
witnesses.233 Applying the federal standards for expert testimony, the 
court held that the proponents’ first witness lacked credibility 
entirely.234 The witness, the court found, failed to address alternative 
theories of the purpose of marriage that had been offered by other 
experts235 and failed to explain the sources or methodology of the 
 
 227. See FED. R. EVID. 701 (limiting lay witness testimony to that which is “rationally based 
on the perception of the witness, . . . helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony 
or the determination of a fact in issue, and . . . not based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge”). 
 228. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 229. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (providing that “facts or data . . . may be those perceived by or 
made known to the expert at or before the hearing,” but that the material must be “of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field”). 
 230. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing that an expert may testify if “the testimony is based 
upon sufficient facts or data, . . . the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and . . . the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case”); 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (holding that a court must “make 
certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal 
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the 
practice of an expert in the relevant field”); see also Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 946–47 (quoting 
Kumho Tire and describing the requirements of Rule 702). 
 231. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 938. 
 232. See id. (concluding that the “plaintiffs’ lay witnesses provided credible testimony”); id. 
at 940 (finding that the “plaintiffs’ experts were amply qualified to offer opinion testimony” and 
concluding that their testimony was credible). 
 233. Id. at 945. 
 234. Id. at 946 (“Blankenhorn’s testimony constitutes inadmissible opinion testimony that 
should be given essentially no weight.”). 
 235. Id. at 947. 
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research upon which his opinions were based.236 The court found that 
the expert’s opinion that biological parents provide better families for 
children than do non-biological parents was “not supported by the 
evidence on which he relied,”237 and that “no credible evidence 
supports [the expert’s] conclusion” that the legalization of gay 
marriage “will lead to the deinstitutionalization of marriage.”238 The 
court pointed out that the witness “opposes marriage for same-sex 
couples . . . despite his recognition that at least thirteen positive 
consequences would flow from state recognition” of same-sex 
marriage.239 
The court likewise discounted most of the testimony offered by 
the proponents’ second expert, the professor of government. The 
expert was called to testify on popular initiatives and on the political 
power of gays and lesbians.240 The court noted the witness’s trial 
testimony was “inconsistent with the opinions he expressed before he 
was retained as an expert,” and that the witness had conceded that 
“gays and lesbians currently face discrimination and that current 
discrimination is relevant to a group’s political power.”241 Questioning 
by the plaintiffs’ attorneys also revealed that the witness’s knowledge 
of discrimination against gays and lesbians was limited,242 and that he 
had not reviewed all of the materials he relied upon in his expert 
report,243 most of which were provided to him by the Proposition 8 
proponents’ attorneys.244 The court therefore found that his “opinions 
on gay and lesbian political power are entitled to little weight and 
only to the extent they are amply supported by reliable evidence.”245 
 
 236. See id. at 948 (“[N]othing in the record other than the ‘bald assurance’ of 
Blankenhorn . . . suggests that Blankenhorn’s investigation into marriage has been conducted to 
the ‘same level of intellectual rigor’ characterizing the practice of anthropologists, sociologists 
or psychologists.” (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995), 
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999))). 
 237. Id. The court found “the evidence does not, and does not claim to, compare biological 
to non-biological parents.” Id. 
 238. Id. at 949. 
 239. Id. at 950. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 952. 
 242. See generally id. at 951–52 (describing the plaintiffs’ voir dire of the expert). 
 243. Id. at 952. 
 244. Id. at 951. 
 245. Id. at 952. 
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2. Rational Basis Review.  As described in the preceding Part, a 
danger of employing an elevated standard of review to same-sex 
marriage bans is that it perpetuates the idea that gay persons are 
seeking special rights—through special review standards—rather than 
legal equality.246 The Perry court’s thorough opinion articulated a 
number of ways in which Proposition 8 would fail heightened 
review—for example, as a violation of the plaintiff couples’ 
fundamental right to marry, or as unjustifiable discrimination based 
on sex or sexual orientation.247 The court avoided the heightened 
scrutiny dangers, however, by finding that Proposition 8 failed even 
the lowest standard of review.248 
After reviewing the evidence and using it to make eighty 
separate findings of fact,249 the court found that—based on 
“overwhelming evidence”250—the amendment’s exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage failed to serve a legitimate interest even under 
rational basis review.251 
 
 246. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text. 
 247. In a novel approach, the court held that because the claimed right was a relational 
one—the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation determined the sex of the person they would choose as a 
spouse—sexual orientation and sex were intertwined. Discrimination because of one amounted 
to discrimination because of the other: 
Proposition 8 targets gays and lesbians in a manner specific to their sexual orientation 
and, because of their relationship to one another, Proposition 8 targets them 
specifically due to sex. Having considered the evidence, the relationship between sex 
and sexual orientation and the fact that Proposition 8 eliminates a right only a gay 
man or a lesbian would exercise, the court determines that plaintiffs’ equal protection 
claim is based on sexual orientation, but this claim is equivalent to a claim of 
discrimination based on sex. 
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996. Discrimination based on sex has long demanded heightened 
scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996) (describing and 
applying the heightened standard of review that is used for sex-based classifications). Based on 
the evidence presented at trial, the court also determined that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation called for strict scrutiny, see Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997, but did not apply it. See 
infra note 248. 
 248. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause renders Proposition 8 
unconstitutional under any standard of review. Accordingly, the court need not address the 
question whether laws classifying on the basis of sexual orientation should be subject to a 
heightened standard of review.”); see also id. at 995 (holding that “Proposition 8 cannot 
withstand rational basis review,” nor may it “survive the strict scrutiny required by plaintiffs’ 
due process claim”). 
 249. Id. at 938–91. 
 250. Id. at 1003. 
 251. Id. at 1002 (“Many of the purported interests identified by proponents are nothing 
more than a fear or unarticulated dislike of same-sex couples. Those interests that are legitimate 
are unrelated to the classification drawn by Proposition 8.”). 
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The amendment’s proponents asserted that Proposition 8 served 
twenty-three legitimate interests.252 The district court condensed those 
interests into five: reserving marriage for one man and one woman, 
guaranteeing that social changes are implemented with caution, 
promoting heterosexual parenting over gay parenting, protecting the 
rights of opponents of same-sex marriage, and treating same-sex 
couples differently than heterosexual couples.253 The court held that 
the amendment failed to reasonably advance any legitimate interest 
the proponents had asserted.254 The extensive findings of fact earlier 
in the opinion helped shape the court’s view of the relevant legal 
issues to be determined and the relevance of prior Supreme Court 
decisions. In determining the nature of the right to marry, the court 
rejected the view that procreation was the dominant purpose of the 
right.255 The court further found that substantial changes in gender 
roles in society and marriage, both in California and nationwide, 
eroded the rationale for barring same-sex couples from marriage: 
“[T]he exclusion exists as an artifact of a time when the genders were 
seen as having distinct roles in society and in marriage. That time has 
passed.”256 The district court explained that the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Loving v. Virginia,257 invalidating interracial marriage bans, 
should be understood not as speaking exclusively to racial 
discrimination, but as showing that greater inclusion need not change 
the definition of marriage.258 
 
 252. Defendant-Intervenors’ Trial Memorandum, supra note 169, at 7–8. Many of the 
asserted interests were redundant, including several on the general theme of preserving and 
strengthening the traditional institution of marriage and emphasizing the procreative elements 
of marriage. Two fairly unique interests asserted were “[a]ccommodating the First Amendment 
rights of individuals and institutions that oppose same-sex marriage on religious or moral 
grounds” and “[u]sing different names for different things.” Id. at 8. 
 253. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
 254. Id. at 1001–02. The court held that Proposition 8 violated both the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 991. 
 255. See id. at 992 (“Never has the state inquired into procreative capacity or intent before 
issuing a marriage license; indeed, a marriage license is more than a license to have procreative 
sexual intercourse. . . . The Supreme Court recognizes that, wholly apart from procreation, 
choice and privacy play a pivotal role in the marital relationship.” (citing Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965))). 
 256. Id. at 993. 
 257. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 258. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (“[T]he Court recognized that race restrictions, 
despite their historical prevalence, stood in stark contrast to the concepts of liberty and choice 
inherent in the right to marry.”). 
CHANDERSON IN FINAL.DOC 3/2/2011  1:25:58 PM 
1454 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1413 
Taking together its findings of fact and the Supreme Court’s 
holdings on the nature of marriage, the Perry court found that “[t]he 
right to marry has been historically and remains the right to choose a 
spouse and, with mutual consent, join together and form a 
household.”259 It concluded that the fundamental right to marry, 
properly characterized, must include same-sex couples: 
Plaintiffs do not seek recognition of a new right. To characterize 
plaintiffs’ objective as “the right to same-sex marriage” would 
suggest that plaintiffs seek something different from what opposite-
sex couples across the state enjoy—namely, marriage. Rather, 
plaintiffs ask California to recognize their relationships for what 
they are: marriages.260 
Domestic partnerships, the court found, did not satisfy the state’s 
obligation to afford same-sex couples the opportunity to marry. 
Instead, “domestic partnerships were created as an alternative to 
marriage that distinguish[es] same-sex from opposite-sex couples.”261 
The evidence presented allowed the court to analyze the 
arguments under the “more searching form of rational basis review” 
dictated by Romer and Lawrence, rather than the permissive or 
assumption-based review standards employed by the state courts. 
Finding no rational connection to any legitimate interest, the Perry 
court arrived at the only remaining conclusion: that Proposition 8 was 
passed to further some illegitimate interest.262 Early in its opinion, the 
court noted that “[t]he state does not have an interest in enforcing 
private moral or religious beliefs without an accompanying secular 
 
 259. Id. at 993. 
 260. Id.; cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“To say that the issue in Bowers 
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put 
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about 
the right to have sexual intercourse.” (emphasis added)). 
 261. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (emphasis added); see also id. at 994 (“The evidence 
shows that domestic partnerships do not fulfill California’s due process obligation to plaintiffs 
for two reasons. First, domestic partnerships are distinct from marriage and do not provide the 
same social meaning as marriage. Second, domestic partnerships were created specifically so 
that California could offer same-sex couples rights and benefits while explicitly withholding 
marriage from same-sex couples. The evidence at trial shows that domestic partnerships exist 
solely to differentiate same-sex unions from marriages. A domestic partnership is not a 
marriage . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 262. See. id. at 1002 (“Here, the purported state interests fit so poorly with Proposition 8 
that they are irrational . . . . What is left is evidence that Proposition 8 enacts a moral view that 
there is something ‘wrong’ with same-sex couples.”). 
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purpose.”263 After rejecting the interests asserted by the proponents, 
the court found that the amendment could only serve those 
illegitimate interests instead. It held that “[t]he evidence shows 
conclusively that Proposition 8 enacts, without reason, a private 
moral view that same-sex couples are inferior to opposite-sex 
couples.”264 Properly relying on the Supreme Court’s statements in 
Romer and Lawrence—that animus or protection of certain 
traditional moral views, standing alone, are not legitimate interests—
the Perry court concluded that Proposition 8 must fall.265 
Against the backdrop of inclusion, marriage bans, including 
Proposition 8, operate as blanket disapprovals of homosexuality. In 
Perry, 
The evidence at trial regarding the campaign to pass Proposition 8 
uncloaks the most likely explanation for its passage: a desire to 
advance the belief that opposite-sex couples are morally superior to 
same-sex couples. . . . Proposition 8 does nothing more than 
enshrine in the California Constitution the notion that opposite-sex 
couples are superior to same-sex couples.266 
Although the state cannot endorse such blanket disapproval, the 
Perry court explicitly noted that individuals and private groups 
remain free to voice whatever moral and religious viewpoints they 
wish.267 Accordingly, churches need not perform same-sex marriage 
ceremonies or recognize the marriages of same-sex couples.268 
D.  The Road Ahead 
After the district court’s decision in Perry, the proponents of 
Proposition 8 quickly appealed to the Ninth Circuit. They also moved 
for a temporary injunction staying the decision, which the Ninth 
Circuit granted,269 placing a hold on the issuance of marriage licenses 
 
 263. Id. at 930–31. 
 264. Id. at 1003. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 1002–03. 
 267. The court noted that “as a matter of law, Proposition 8 does not affect the rights of 
those opposed to homosexuality or to marriage for couples of the same sex.” Id. at 1001. 
Moreover, it “does not affect any First Amendment right or responsibility of parents to educate 
their children.” Id. at 1000. 
 268. Id. at 976–77. 
 269. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 
2010) (order granting appellants’ motion to stay). 
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to same-sex couples until it could hear the case. Prominent 
constitutional law scholars, including Erwin Chemerinsky, raised 
serious questions about the proponents’ standing to appeal the 
decision at all,270 and the Ninth Circuit ordered the proponents to 
brief the issue.271 Imperial County, California, then moved to 
intervene as an appellant.272 
The Ninth Circuit sua sponte ordered an expedited review 
schedule273 and heard oral arguments on December 6, 2010. It allowed 
two hours of argument, with the first hour dedicated to the issue of 
standing and the second devoted to the merits of the constitutional 
challenge to Proposition 8.274 During arguments the panel was 
particularly focused on why a county might have standing to 
challenge an order directing it to issue marriage licenses—an issue of 
state, not local, policy. The court held on January 4, 2011, that the 
county did not have standing to appeal the district court’s decision as 
an intervenor,275 and it certified the issue of the proponents’ standing 
to the California Supreme Court.276 
The unique situation presented by California’s refusal to defend 
Proposition 8 raises a strong possibility that the Ninth Circuit will 
dismiss the case for lack of standing without reaching the merits of 
the challenge. Regardless of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, if the Supreme 
 
 270. Erwin Chemerinsky, Who Has Standing to Appeal Prop. 8 Ruling?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
15, 2010, at A30. 
 271. Perry, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (“In addition to any issues appellants wish to raise on 
appeal, appellants are directed to include in their opening brief a discussion of why this appeal 
should not be dismissed for lack of Article III standing.”). 
 272. Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 24–29, Perry, No. 10-16696, 
available at http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/2010.09.17-
Defendant-Intervenor-Filing.pdf. 
 273. Perry, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1. 
 274. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. 10-16696, 10-16751 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010) (order 
setting oral arguments), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/11/15/
10-16696_10-16751_order.pdf. 
 275. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16751, slip op. at 13 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/9th-Circuit-Imperial-County-Ruling.pdf. 
 276. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) (order 
certifying a question to the Supreme Court of California) (inquiring whether, under California 
law, proponents have a “particularized interest in the initiative’s validity” or may otherwise 
defend Proposition 8 when the state refuses to do so), available at http://www.afer.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/AFER-9th-Circuit-Standing-Question.pdf. For a good discussion of the 
certified question and the parties’ arguments, see Lyle Denniston, Prop. 8: Battling in New 
Arena, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 24, 2011, 11:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/prop-8-
battling-in-new-arena. 
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Court were to grant certiorari,277 the thorny standing question would 
allow the Court—generally reluctant to reach controversial questions 
it does not have to reach—to decide the case on less controversial 
grounds, by ruling that none of the proponents have standing to 
appeal.278 
Uncertainty about how the Court would dispose of a gay-
marriage-ban challenge has long dissuaded gay rights advocates from 
launching a direct federal challenge, and some of those advocates 
openly displayed skepticism—and even contempt—at the challenge 
filed in Perry.279 In deciding Lawrence, the Court left itself an out for 
such a challenge, saying that the case “does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”280 But, dicta notwithstanding, the 
 
 277. Commentators have projected that Perry will reach the Supreme Court and lawyers on 
both sides have not shied away from a Supreme Court challenge. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Both 
Sides in California’s Gay Marriage Fight See a Long Court Battle Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
2010, at A12 (noting that “both sides expect [Perry] to wind its way up the federal judicial food 
chain, most likely all the way to the Supreme Court”); Michael C. Dorf, A Federal Judge Strikes 
Down California’s Proposition 8: Will the Ruling Ultimately Advance or Retard Civil Rights for 
LGBT Americans?, FINDLAW (Aug. 9, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100809.html 
(“Although some of Judge Walker’s opinion focused on facts and circumstances that are unique 
to California, the core logic of the ruling implies that gay and lesbian couples throughout the 
country have a federal constitutional right to marry.  Thus, should the decision be affirmed by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court will come under 
considerable pressure to consider the case.”); Prop. 8 Foes, Backers Look to Supreme Court 
Showdown on Gay Marriage, L.A. NOW (Aug. 5, 2010, 7:42 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.
com/lanow/2010/08/prop-8-foes-backers-look-to-supreme-court-showdown-on-gay-marriage-
.html (“A day after Proposition 8 was thrown out in court, both sides in California’s debate over 
gay marriage are focusing on the next fight in a battle that is likely to end up before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.”). 
 278. If the Ninth Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court determines that the intervenors lack 
standing to appeal, the legal status of the district court’s opinion is not crystal clear. Although a 
district court’s final judgment stands absent an appeal, the parties disagree on the status of a 
decision when the defendants cannot appeal for lack of standing. See Perry, No. 10-16751, slip 
op. at 6 n.2 (noting the disagreement between the plaintiffs and the Proposition 8 proponents on 
whether the district court’s order would stand if proponents’ appeal was dismissed for lack of 
standing). 
 279. See Eskridge & Spedale, supra note 2 (“This is a brash, bold move to nationalize 
marriage equality and raise the stakes of the debate.”). See generally Jim Carlton, Federal Suit 
Divides Gay-Marriage Backers, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at A3 (describing gay rights activists’ 
ambivalence toward the federal challenge); Ted Olson’s Supreme Court Adventure, N.Y. TIMES 
ROOM FOR DEBATE (Aug. 18, 2009, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/08/18/ted-olsons-supreme-court-adventure (describing criticism by gay marriage advocates 
that the Perry challenge was premature). 
 280. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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Court’s analysis in gay rights cases overall indicates that the Court 
may be open to a gay marriage challenge—if the facts are right. 
In that regard, Perry was a game changer. The extensive 
evidentiary record showed the real discrimination endured by gay 
couples and their children. More importantly, it showed that the 
proponents could muster no believable reason, aside from their 
personal religious and moral beliefs, for propagating that 
discrimination. Under the state-neutrality analysis the Supreme Court 
has laid out, Proposition 8 should plainly fall. 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, same-sex families have sought the freedom to 
marry. Religious and social conservatives, meanwhile, have sought 
the freedom to disapprove of homosexuality. The Supreme Court has 
struck a laudable balance between these two positions. On both ends, 
the Court has ordered the state to stay out of the culture war. The 
voluminous evidence presented in Perry revealed that the proponents 
of California’s Proposition 8 acted to ban same-sex marriage for no 
reason other than to propagate discrimination against gay couples. 
Moreover, because a state’s issuance of a civil marriage license is a 
governmental—rather than a private or religious—act, that issuance 
could not be said to burden individual or organizational rights to 
disapprove of homosexuality. Under Romer and Lawrence, the state’s 
enforcement of Proposition 8 violates same-sex couples’ rights to due 
process and equal protection. 
In a well-known quote in Lawrence, the Supreme Court noted 
that “times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see 
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress.”281 If the Court is true to its state-neutrality approach, it will 
necessarily follow the lead of the Perry court and allow the 
evidence—showing that gay marriage bans have no rational basis—to 
carry the day. 
 
 281. Id. at 579. 
